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1.  Introduction 
 
This  paper investigates  which factors influence  airlines’  decisions  when 
planning pricing strategies. We explore the impact of market structure and 
airlines pricing behaviour in a specific geographical context characterised 
by  a  low  level  of  intermodal  competition.  The  data  used  is,  in  fact, 
collected  on  a  sample  of  southern  Italian  routes,  for  which  alternative 
accessibility  through  different  modes  of  transport  is  limited.  We  focus 
primarily  on  a  specific  type  of  pricing  strategy:  the  intertemporal  price 
discrimination  (IPD).  The  IPD  consists  in  charging  different  fares  to 
different travellers according to the days missing to departure when the 
ticket is bought. The work aims to verify whether market’s concentration 
levels play a significant role in defining fare levels and, more in particular, 
whether airlines are more or less keen to engage in IPD when competition 
increases or when it reduces.  
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we survey the relevant 
literature; the data collection is described Section 3 and in Section 4 we 
present the empirical strategy. Afterward, in Section 5 we discuss the main 
outcomes and in Section 6 we draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
Airlines engage in price discrimination (PD) to discern travellers with a 
relative inelastic demand from travellers with a more elastic one to extract 
their surplus. Gaggero (2010) identifies three categories of travellers. Early 
bookers show a slightly inelastic demand: they are willing to pay quite 
higher fares to travel during vacations. Middle-bookers exhibit an higher 
elastic demand: being more flexible, search for the cheapest fares. Late-
bookers reveal an inelastic demand: business travellers book tickets few 
days before the departure with fixed travel dates and destinations. Airline 
fares display a trend over time whose shape reminds a J-curve reflecting the 
opposite  pattern  of  demand  elasticity:  travellers  heterogeneity  is  a 
necessary condition to fruitfully implement IPD. 
The IPD starts to be empirically analysed by Bachis and Piga (2007) that 
examine the UK flights to and from Europe: fares remain more stable when 
departure is further away whereas volatility increases as departure comes 
nearer.  Investigating  the  Ryan  Air’s  IPD  strategy  in  the  UK  market, 
Alderighi and Piga (2010) show a U-shaped trend; exploring the British-
isles, Gaggero and Piga (2010) illustrate that fares pattern over time of 
individual flights follows the J-curve. 
Traditionally  market  power  enhances  the  ability  of  firms  to  price 
discriminate. In the airline industry when competition increases the mark-
ups associated to the fares paid by business travellers decrease and align 
with the ones of leisure travellers. However travellers differ in the degree of 
brand  loyalty:  business  travellers  are  more  brand  loyal  than  leisure 
travellers  since  the  join  frequent-flyer  programs.  When  competition 
increases, the mark-ups applied to leisure travellers decrease whereas the 
ones  of  business  travellers  remain  almost  unchanged:  PD  increases  as 
competition increases. Theoretical contributions demonstrate that PD can 
be implemented in competitive markets if travellers show heterogeneity of 
brand preferences (Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989)), time valuation and 
demand uncertainty (Gale (1993), Dana (1998)).  
On the empirical side Stavins (2001), exploring the US airline industry, and 
Giaume and Guillou (2004), exploring the intra-European market defined 
by flights from Nice (France), provide evidence that PD is enforced when   3
markets are more competitive: ticket restrictions reduce fares although the 
effect  becomes  poorer  in  more  concentrated  markets.  Consistently 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) on the US airline industry find that PD are 
undertaken  in  more  competitive  markets  since  in  more  concentrated 
markets the price dispersion is lower.  
Gerardi  and  Shapiro  (2009)  replicate  the  cross-sectional  analysis  of 
Borenstein and Rose (1994), reaching the same results; however when they 
set up a panel analysis they achieve opposite results
1. Analysing the British 
isles’ market, Gaggero and Piga (2011) find that few companies with large 
market  shares  can  easily  price  discriminate.  However  Hayes  and  Ross 
(1998) and Mantin and Koo (2009) find no evidence: price dispersion is 




3.  The Data 
 
Data on posted fares are collected to replicate travellers’ behaviour when 
making  reservations  for  business  or  leisure  trips:  we  identify  plausible 
round trips and use airlines’ websites to simulate reservations. We observe 
fares  daily  starting,  generally,  sixty  booking  days  before  departure. 
Therefore we define a dataset composed by 20.175 observations on 440 
round-trips. The observation period is from November 2006 to February 
2011; our sample includes 15 city-pairs (Table I) and 10 carriers
2. Both 
FSCs and LCCs are considered, thus we choose the basic services (no add-
ons) to make comparable carriers’ supply. 
 
 
1 The panel approach estimates the effect of competition by accounting for changes in the 
competitive  structure  of  a  given  route  over  time  rather  than  changes  in  competitive 
structures across routes. 
2 The list of companies is available from the authors. It includes, among other companies, 
Alitalia and the major European low cost carriers.   4
 
 
Given  the  city-pair,  if  carriers  do  not  provide  flights  for  the  selected 
departure and return dates, they are not counted among the competitors. In 
addition, round-trips enable to account for peak-periods to verify if airlines 
adjust their pricing in phases characterized by greater demand. Airport data 
are taken to define the daily number of flights of each company and the 
data  on  demand.  Finally,  data  on  the  distance  between  the  two  route 
endpoints belong to the World Airport Codes’ web site. 
 
 
4.  Empirical strategy 
 
We specify our empirical strategy drawing on Stavins (2001): 
 
Ln (Pijt) = β0 + β1Market Structureij + β2Booking Dayt + β3Booking Day
2
t + 
β4(Market Structureij*Booking Dayt) + θ5Flight Characteristicsijt 
+ θ6Route dummiesj + ￿t +εijt 
 
where i indexes the carrier, j the route, t the time. Time refers to the number 
of times we observe the fares, it goes from 1 to 60. For some round-trips 
we have less than sixty observations thus we manage an unbalanced panel.  
The equation is estimated with the Random Effects (RE) estimator. The 
dependent variable is the log of the fares. Booking Day measures the IPD 
and ranges from 1 to 60, Booking Day
2 accounts for the non-linearity.   5
We define two proxies of market structure at city-pair level
3: Market Share, 
average share of the daily flights operated by an airline at the two endpoints 
of a city-pair, and the relating Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
Flight Characteristics are:  Holiday, a peak-periods dummy equal to 1 in 
case of holidays, 0 otherwise; LCC, a carrier dummy equal to 1 if an airline 
is a low cost, 0 otherwise. 
Route Dummies captures the route-specific effects; ￿t is a set of monthly 
dummies for each year controlling for seasonal effects, εijt is the error term. 
We treat the endogeneity by employing instruments largely adopted in the 
literature
4: the observed carrier’s geometric mean of enplanements at the 
endpoints divided by the sum across all carriers of the geometric mean of 
each carrier’s enplanements at the endpoint airports, targeted Market Share; 
the square of the market share fitted value plus the rescaled sum of the 
squares of all other carriers’ shares, targeted to HHI; the distance in km 
between the two route endpoints, addressed to both. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The following table displays our estimates:  
 
 
3  We  need  the  city-pair  level  to  capture  the  real  competition  between  carriers  since  in 
perpherical areas almost all the carriers operate as a monopolist on a given route. 
4 The first two instruments are designed by Borenstein (1989) pg 351-353.   6
 
   
Market Share and HHI have a positive and significant impact on fares, 
robust  across  regressions:  the  market  power  due  to  the  higher  market 
concentration allows airlines to increase fares. Moreover the negative and 
significant impact of Booking Day on fares shows that airlines effectively 
engage in IPD. Booking Day
2 allows to detect the so-called J-curve effect: 
early-bookers  pay  moderately  higher  price  compared  to  middle-bookers, 
whereas late-bookers pay the highest fares. 
The interaction of Booking Day with Market Share or HHI is positive and 
significant, claiming that more concentrated markets are less suitable for 
the enforcement of IPD strategies. Our results provide arguments in favour 
of competitive discrimination as Borestein and Rose (1994), Stavins (2001) 
and  Giaume  and  Guillou  (2004),  although  contrasting  with  Gerardi  and 
Shapiro  (2007)  and  Gaggero  and  Piga  (2011).  The  results  of  control 
variables are those expected. Holiday is positive and significant: during   7
peak  periods  airlines  exploit  the  greater  demand  setting  higher  fares. 





6.  Conclusions 
 
We  have  explored  airlines  pricing  strategies  defining  which  factors 
influence  airline  decisions  in  specific  geographical  areas.  Our  main 
findings  show  that  the  market  power  arising  from  more  concentrated 
markets leads to higher fares. Airlines do undertake the IPD strategy: fares 
distribution  seems  to  follows  a  J-curve  by  which  airlines  exploit  the 
different  willingness  to  pay  of  travellers  to  maximize  their  profit.  The 
empirical  evidence  is  in  favor  of  “competitive  discrimination”:  a  more 
competitive market structure fosters the implementation of IPD strategies. 
Moreover LCCs adopt a more aggressive pricing behavior by setting, on 
average,  lower  fares.  One  might  argue  that  PD  is  only  beneficial  for 
airlines. Nevertheless in more competitive markets airlines charge lower 
fares that, together with the IPD, allow to target larger segments of demand 
which leads to a "democratisation" of air travel. 
Developments  for  future  research  could  be  twofold.  On  the  one  hand, 
following the preliminary analysis carried out in Bergantino and Capozza 
(2011a, 2011b), we plan to enlarge the territorial coverage of the study in 
order  to  compare  different  exogenously  determined  accessibility 
conditions. We aim to investigate whether airlines exploit their dominant 
position  with  respect  to  both  modal  -  as  in  the  case  of  mergers  -  and 
intermodal competition. In the latter case, we aim to test whether the lack 
of alternative transport services strengthens airlines power, thus reflecting 
in  higher  fares  and  more  aggressive  pricing  strategies  with  respect  to 
customers. On the second hand, we would like to test the role of low cost 
carriers in terms of net benefits for accessibility. Furthermore, we aim to 
take account of the local governments’ subsidies, often granted to airlines, 
to evaluate their impact on fares and pricing strategies and, thus, on the net 




5 In line with the findings of Bergantino (2009). Exploring carriers pricing behavior on some 
Italian routes involving small airports, she highlights, in fact, that LCCs post, on average, 
half the fares of FSCs.   8
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